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ITEM VI.

Future of FIEND/VALUABLE.

1. These discussions were held in the light of the minutes of the recent Rome meeting on Fiend/Valuable, with which both sides were familiar.

2. S.I.S. indicated the general line the Foreign Office were likely to take over the future of Fiend/Valuable. C.I.A. said that the statement of the Foreign Office position did not appear to deal at all with the question - formally regarded as important by both the Foreign Office and the State Department - of discussions of a strategic character between Greece and Yugoslavia with a view to averting the possibilities of a clash between them in the event of a collapse of the Albanian regime for whatever reasons. It was noted that the State Department had not yet commented on the Foreign Office paper which included a statement that their policy towards Albania was that its independence should be maintained. Future joint operations in this area depend in large degree on policy agreement between the State Department and the Foreign Office. S.I.S. will bring this point to the attention of the Foreign Office.

State Dept. copy
in FO. hands
in Dec 1951.

3. It was agreed that a small working party should consider and report to the full conference on the question of defining the degree of collaboration between C.I.A. and S.I.S. in next season's work into Albania, both on intelligence getting and S.O. (Report attached as Appendix B)

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ITEM VII. Consideration of a Joint Operation in Yugoslavia
in the Event of a Cominform Attack.

1. C.I.A. stated its belief that there should be in readiness a mission to go into Yugoslavia should hostilities break out there. This should, if possible, be a joint U.S. - British mission with personnel previously selected and a minimum quantity of supplies immediately available.
 2. S.I.S. stated that they, in connection with the British military, already had a small mission in readiness.
 3. Mr. Wisner emphasized that C.I.A. had no intention whatsoever of dealing independently of Marshall Tito so long as he remained in power.
 4. C.I.A.'s opinion was that before undertaking any detailed discussions on the military level a contact should be established with Marshall Tito. S.I.S. explained that the proposed head of the mission was willing to contact Tito provided he was so authorized by the British and U.S. authorities responsible.
 5. Further discussion was deferred to a meeting with the proposed head of the mission the following day. A report on this meeting will be circulated separately.
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ITEM VIII. Review of other Operations affecting the Soviet Orbit, e.g. Bulgaria.

1. Taking Bulgaria as an example S.I.S. suggested that greater collaboration on world-wide activities affecting a particular target area was essential if anything better than the present low level of agents was to be recruited without clashing.
 2. C.I.A. and S.I.S. have both made approaches to King Michael of Rumania. C.I.A. felt there would be benefit in ensuring approaches of this kind were not divergent.
 3. A working party was designated to consider and report to the full conference on the position in certain satellite countries and the degree of collaboration in what might be done there and in the recruiting of agents (report attached as Appendix C). They should draw up a list of items which collaboration in any area might embrace to a varying extent, a draft list to be presented by S.I.S. (report attached as Appendix D).
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APPENDIX B

FIEND/VALUABLE

1. At the Rome conference it was mutually agreed that our operations into Albania during 1952 should take a different form than in the past. Under the new conception higher grade agents would be used for the penetration of the Sigurimi and the Albanian armed forces, such agents operating on a more clandestine basis than heretofore.
2. To put this policy into effect the following vital factors have to be taken into consideration:-
 - (a) Extremely limited recruiting field, possibly 12/15 suitable men.
 - (b) The size of the country, namely not much larger than Wales or New Hampshire.
 - (c) The very few secure contacts within the country at our disposal.
3. In view of these factors S.I.S. consider that a far greater degree of operational engagement will be required in 1952 than has been the case in the past. If this is not achieved they foresee not only the possibility of considerable friction in the field of recruitment but what is more important the high probability of effective action within the country being unwittingly jeopardised owing to the activities of the other partner. They therefore propose that with Albania as a target a degree of operational engagement as outlined in the attached list should apply.
4. It is understood that operational responsibility will in each case remain disengaged. Should it appear obvious that either in the planning, briefing or progress of an operation by one partner, the activities of the other partner are jeopardised, then this fact should be brought to the notice of the partner concerned. Should no agreement be reached on an operational level then the question should be referred for decision between the two headquarters.

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FIEND/VALUABLE

Degree of Operational Engagement in those Circumstances
when C.I.A. and S.I.S. are operating in Conformity with
a jointly agreed Directive

I. Operational Planning.

That there should be a full and free exchange of operational plans which may be formed by C.I.A. or S.I.S. in order to take action in support of an agreed Policy Directive. This exchange to be of a general as opposed to a specific nature. *Now in effect in the case of Friend.*

II. Recruitment.

That both S.I.S. and C.I.A. should disclose to each other the names and localities of their potential recruits and that each side shall benefit from the information held on the personal cards of such persons. Recruitment would be independent but with the knowledge of the other partner.

III. Training.

That the training of recruits shall be carried out by each partner independently.

IV. Operational Intelligence.

That each side shall put at the disposal of the other such local intelligence they may have which may be of assistance in the satisfactory launching of the operation.

V. Operational Briefing.

To be conducted independently but with the knowledge of the other partner, in particular with regards to timing, localities to be visited and personnel to be contacted within the target area.

VI. Documentation.

That such documents as may be at the disposal of either C.I.A. or S.I.S. shall be made available to each other for operational purposes.

VII. Air, Sea and Land Infiltration.

That full information regarding the facilities available to either side shall be exchanged and in conformity with

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paragraph I placed at the disposal of the other partner.
Operation responsibility remaining however independent.

VIII. Operational Progress Reports.

Frequent exchange of reports, reporting the progress of parties in the field, their present position and future intentions. Such reports to include details of timing, localities and contacts.

IX. Sea and Land Exfiltration.

See paragraph VII.

✓ X. De-Briefing.

To be carried out independently but the verbatim de-briefing reports to be made available to either side.

XI. Intelligence.

The pooling of all intelligence regarding the target area from whatever source.

✓ XII. Disposal.

The pooling of disposal resources.
